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Adaptive success in social animals depends on an
ability to infer the likely actions of others. Little is
known about the neural computations that underlie
this capacity. Here, we show that the brain models
the values and choices of others even when these
values are currently irrelevant. These modeled
choices use the same computations that underlie
our own choices, but are resolved in a distinct neigh-
boring medial prefrontal brain region. Crucially,
however, when subjects choose on behalf of a
partner instead of themselves, these regions ex-
change their functional roles. Hence, regions that
represented values of the subject’s executed
choices now represent the values of choices
executed on behalf of the partner, and those that
previously modeled the partner now model the
subject. These data tie together neural computations
underlying self-referential and social inference, and
in so doing establish a new functional axis character-
izing the medial wall of prefrontal cortex.
INTRODUCTION
Across many species, behavior is driven by an ability to evaluate
candidate actions with respect to one’s own motives. In social
animals, the success of different actions may also depend on
the preferences and actions of other individuals. Thus, adaptive
success crucially depends on our ability to make inferences
about the motives, values, and likely actions of others. In human
behavior, this social valuation process is often a dominant factor
shaping decisions. For example, a central factor determining the
value of a new property is what the buyer believes other people
will pay for it when it is later resold.When purchasing a new piece
of clothing, the buyer (if not a neuroscientist) will often consider
how it will appear in the eyes of others.
In the human brain, two neighboring regions of medial pre-
frontal cortex are often implicated in these two different functions1114 Neuron 75, 1114–1121, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc(Amodio and Frith, 2006). In studies of decision making and
neuroeconomics, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) con-
sistently reflects an individual’s subjective valuation (Behrens
et al., 2008; Boorman et al., 2009; Knutson et al., 2005; Plass-
mann et al., 2007). By contrast, its dorsomedial neighbor (rostral
dmPFC) predominates in studies of social cognition when an
individual must impute intentionality to others—exhibiting so-
called theory of mind (Behrens et al., 2008; Frith and Frith,
1999, 2006; Hampton et al., 2008; Saxe, 2006).
While vmPFC responses to valuation and goal-directed choice
are the subject of several computational theories (Boorman
et al., 2009; Hare et al., 2011; Hunt et al., 2012; Levy and
Glimcher, 2011; Lim et al., 2011), only scant attention has been
given to computational mechanisms underlying dmPFC social
responses (Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008; Yoshida
et al., 2010). One possibility is that the ability to impute the inten-
tions (Frith and Frith, 2006) and predict the actions (Behrens
et al., 2008) of others derives from the same mechanisms that
allow us to reflect on our own goals and actions (Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Mitchell, 2009). Such
a theory is appealing, as it would allow a computational under-
standing of goal-directed choice to be extended to social
inferences.
However, this idea is difficult to reconcile with the existence of
brain regions that appear specialized for processing self and
other. Instead, it raises the intriguing possibility that a functional
specialization in rostromedial prefrontal cortex (and in related
temporoparietal cortex; Mitchell, 2008; Saxe and Wexler, 2005)
is drivenmore by differences between choices that are executed
versus those that are imagined or modeled. Teasing these two
possible functional architectures apart is problematic as they
are almost always aligned in cognitive tasks, where self-choices
tend to be executed and others’ actions and intentions modeled.
Here, we describe neural signals that compute the choice
preferences of another individual, whether or not they are rele-
vant to the current choice. These signals precisely mirror well-
studied signals reflecting personal choice preferences. Further-
more, by designing situations in which values of self and other
may be either modeled or executed, we show that the functional
gradient in the medial prefrontal cortex does not align with the
individual, but is dependent on whether choices are executed
by the subject or instead are modeled without overt execution..
CA
B D
Subject’s values
Partner’s values
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Self quest Other trained Self scan Other scan
%
 d
el
ay
ed
 c
ho
ic
e
2 sec
every 40 trials
3 sec 2 sec 1-4 sec
+
Option A Option B
£10
today
£30
5 months
Option A Option B
£10
today
£30
5 months
Choose for 
Mary
Choose for 
yourself
or
Option A Option B
£10
today
£30
5 months
Option A Option B
£10
today
£26
1 week
10 25
10 5
10 25
10 20
k1
k2
 0.01   0.1     1 10
0.003
0.006
 0.02
 0.04
  0.1
  0.3
  0.6
    2
    4
10 −0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 1. Experimental Design and Behavior
(A) Trial timeline for the fMRI task of delegated intertemporal choice. In blocks of 40 trials, the frame of reference is changed between choosing for self and for
partner.
(B) Illustrative valuations from two example trials. Here, the subject exemplifies a relatively low discounter, as shown by the small influence of delay on value, while
the partner is a relatively higher discounter. Note that there are four values to consider in the task: preferred and nonpreferred values for the subject and the
partner. By computing value differences in the two frames of reference, we could dissociate both the different discount rates and the different choices of the two
individuals. In this example, the subject’s value difference would be 15 in both trials, but the partner’s would be 5 and 10.
(C) Correlation matrix between predicted value-related BOLD responses for partners with different temporal discount rates (k). Predicted response is assumed to
align with the difference between chosen and unchosen values of each player. Reward and delays in the choice set were optimized to minimize overall predicted
correlations (see Supplemental Information). Participants were prescreened to measure their discount rates and then paired to minimize correlations. Green dots
represent the pairs of participants. Indeed the self and other value differences were broadly decorrelated in the experimental data (mean r = 0.11).
(D) Average percent choice of the high-value long-delay option for high discounters (light) and low discounters (dark). Shown are choices in the prescreening
questionnaire, during training on their partner’s choice preferences, andwhen choosing for self and for other in the fMRI experiment. Error bars show the standard
error of the mean. Note that high discounters were paired with low discounters and vice versa. The behavioral flipping indicates that subjects learnt their partner’s
preferences.
See Figure S1.
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Value Computations for Choice and Modeled ChoiceRESULTS
To examine neural computations for self and others in medial
prefrontal cortex, we designed a delegated intertemporal deci-
sion-making task (Figure 1A). Subjects chose between a large
monetary reward delivered later, and a small reward delivered
sooner. Critically, we asked subjects to choose for themselves
in some trials, but in other trials to choose on the basis of what
a partner participant would have chosen in the same context
(Figure 1A). It is known that different individuals display signifi-
cant variability in their preferences, with ‘‘low-discounters’’
preferring to wait for a later higher-value option and ‘‘high-
discounters’’ preferring the more immediate smaller reward
(Kable and Glimcher, 2007). This behavioral variability is quanti-Neufied by estimating a subject’s unique ‘‘discount rate,’’ a param-
eter that captures an individual’s disposition to discount the
value of delayed relative to more immediate reward.
We were interested in neural signals that distinguish the
two individuals both in terms of their subjective valuations and
in terms of their choices. In previous studies of value com-
parison, vmPFC activity has been found to correlate with the
subjective value difference between chosen and unchosen
options (Basten et al., 2010; Boorman et al., 2009; FitzGerald
et al., 2009). Because this signal distinguishes between chosen
and unchosen values, it is assumed that this region accesses
both subjective values and choice (Wunderlich et al., 2010). In
our delegated choice task, however, there are four different
values to consider (Figure 1B). We reasoned that a signal thatron 75, 1114–1121, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1115
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Value Computations for Choice and Modeled Choicerepresents the subject’s own choices would correlate with the
difference in valuations between the subject’s preferred and
nonpreferred options (Basten et al., 2010; Boorman et al.,
2009; FitzGerald et al., 2009). Similarly, a signal that represents
the partner’s choices should also reflect a value difference
signal, but here computed according both to the partner’s own
values and choice preferences (i.e., the partner’s valuation of
the option that the partner would have chosen minus the
partner’s valuation of the option that the partner would have
left unchosen) (Figure 1B).
Crucially, we required that these two value difference signals
(self and other) could be identified simultaneously in evoked
brain activity. We took two steps to ensure this would be the
case (see Supplemental Information for more detail and Fig-
ure S1 available online). First, we prescreened 87 potential
participants, using their choices in an online intertemporal choice
questionnaire to estimate their individual discount rate. Twenty
participants were then paired for the main experiment, such
that each pair of individuals comprised one high and one low
discounter. Consequently, by design, there would be many trials
where the two partners express preference for different options
(Figure 1B; Table S1). Second, we optimized the selection of in-
tertemporal choices presented in the scanner such that the
subjective value signals of the two participants (determined by
their unique discount rates) would be maximally decorrelated
(Figure 1C). An example of how this approach decorrelates the
different choice variables can be found in the Supplemental
Information.
Prior to scanning, ten pairs of subjects completed a trial-and-
error learning session in which they each could learn their part-
ner’s preferences from their online prescreen questionnaire
choices (Figure 1D; see Supplemental Information). Partners
then met each other and were subsequently each scanned,
with their partner viewing from the operator room. During fMRI
scanning, participants were presented with a new set of inter-
temporal choices in blocks of 40 trials. In each block, the subject
in the scanner made choices either on behalf of themselves, or
on behalf of their partner. At the end of the experiment, two of
their actual choices would be realized: one prize randomly
selected from the self-regarding blocks would go to the subject,
and one from the other-regarding blockswould go to the partner.
We reasoned that, if the functional organization of medial
frontal cortex is tied to the frame of reference of the individual
(Behrens et al., 2009; Jenkins et al., 2008), then the vmPFC signal
would always reflect the subject’s own value difference and the
rostral dmPFC always reflect their partner’s value difference. In
other words, the mPFC would show a functional gradient along
an axis of self (ventrally) to other (dorsally). In contrast, if the
organization is tied to the relevance of valuation for current
choice, then this axis would show a gradient of executed values
(i.e., self values during self choice and other values during other
choice) to modeled values (i.e., other values during self choice
and self values during other choice).
To test these two opposing hypotheses, we recomputed
subject’s discount rates and resultant valuations on the basis
of the choices made in the scanner and identified regions of
the brain that correlated with value difference averaged across
both reference frames (Figure 2A), i.e., highlighting value-sensi-1116 Neuron 75, 1114–1121, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inctive regions independently from their preferred frame. Within
these regions, we tested whether there was a functional gradient
along an axis of either self versus other, or executed versus
modeled. We identified a large value-sensitive region spanning
the medial wall of the rostral PFC (Figure 2A), which provided
a functional mask reflecting any value difference encoding that
was orthogonal to the statistical tests subsequently performed.
Within this mask, no gradient was apparent when we compared
self to partner value differences, but a clear ventral-dorsal gra-
dient was immediately apparent when we compared executed
to modeled value differences (Figure 2B), with more ventral
regions reflecting executed and more dorsal regions modeled
choices.
To perform a formal test of these differences, we fitted a
regression slope to data extracted at five distinct locations span-
ning a ventral-dorsal axis (Figure 2A; Figure S2). Put simply, we
tested whether there was a linear relationship between spatial
position and functional coding. Across the group, we found
a significant gradient along an executed/modeled axis (t[18] =
6.28, z = 4.513, p < 0.00001), but no such gradient for self versus
other (t[18] =1.06, z =1.02 p > 0.30). The difference between
these two gradients, indicative of the two candidate functional
organizations, survived a formal comparison (paired t[18] =
6.18, z = 4.47, p < 0.00001; Figure 2C). We also note that, among
other regions implicated in valuation, a similar gradient was
exhibited in temporoparietal cortex (TPC) (x = 34 to 54, y =
54, z = 20 to 38, t[18] = 4.25, z = 3.49, p < 0.0005). Again, no
such gradient could be found when we analyzed the data in
the frame of reference of self versus other, and again the differ-
ence in the two candidate regression slopes survived formal
statistical comparison (paired t[18] = 3.1, z = 2.74, p < 0.01;
Figure 2C).
These data identify a dorsal-ventral functional organization
of the medial PFC that does not follow a frame of reference of
self versus other, but instead is tied to a frame of reference of
executed versus modeled choices. To explore the data that
underlies this functional gradient, we looked at activity that
correlated with subjective preference-related activity separately
under each choice condition (choice for self or for other). In
blocks where subjects chose on behalf of themselves, activity
in vmPFC correlated with the difference between the subject’s
valuation (discounted by their own discount rate) for the chosen
and unchosen options (Figure 3A), thus reflecting their personal
choice preferences (Montreal Neurological Institute [MNI] atlas
12, 53, 11, t = 3.31, z = 2.76). Simultaneously, dmPFC activity
also exhibited a value difference correlate but here values were
discounted according to the partner’s discount rate, and the
relevant value difference was between the partner’s preferred
and nonpreferred choices (MNI 3, 41, 25, t = 5.00, z = 3.75).
Hence in self-choice trials, despite the fact that the partner’s
valuation bore no relevance to the task, dmPFC activity never-
theless reflected the experimental subject’s estimate of their
partner’s preferences.
As predicted by the gradient analysis, we observed a dramat-
ically different pattern of activity during the delegated choice
condition (Figure 3B). When subjects now made choices on
behalf of their partner, these regions precisely swapped agents,
such that the vmPFC now maintained an estimate of the.
A B
p<0.001
Modelled
p<0.001 
Executed
x=0
z=0
p<0.01
y=-65
C p<0.00001
ns
Exec - mod
gradient
Self - other
gradient
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
p<0.01
Exec - mod 
gradient
Self - other
gradient
ns
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
-0.6
*
* *
*
Medial Prefrontal Cortex Temporo-parietal Cortex
0
*
*
* *
*
Schematic of Gradient 
approach in single subject
Anatomical location (as in A)
Eff
ec
t s
iz
e 
fo
r c
on
tr
as
t o
f i
nt
er
es
t
Figure 2. Gradient of Functional Organization in the Rostromedial Prefrontal Cortex
(A) Regions of prefrontal cortex responding to the average contrast of value difference over all trials, i.e., across both self and other values (p < 0.01). Yellow dots
are equally spaced along the activity profile and serve as the spatial markers for the analysis in (C).
(B)Within the region of overall value sensitivity (shown in A), some regions respondmore to the value difference that will be acted on in the current trial (executed in
red), and some to the currently irrelevant value difference (modeled in blue).
(C) Left: A spatial gradient analysis of functional contrast against position along the ventral-dorsal axis of medial prefrontal cortex (see colored dots in A). Left: In
each subject, data from five anatomical locations are mapped onto a line and the spatial regression slope is computed. Right: Across subjects there is a strong
gradient, with executed value effects expressed in more ventral and modeled value effects in more dorsal zones. No such dorsoventral gradient exists for the
contrast of self-versus-other. The difference between the two gradients (indicating a difference of a difference) was significant (p < 0.00001). Error bars show the
standard error of the mean. Right: Results of an equivalent spatial gradient analysis in the temporoparietal cortex. Sagittal sections through TPC are shown in
Figure S2E.
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Value Computations for Choice and Modeled Choicepartner’s values, expressed in the frame of reference of the
choices made on behalf of the partner (MNI 6, 23, 11, t =
7.36, z = 4.94). Conversely, the dmPFC now reflected the
subject’s own values, signed according to the choices that the
subject themselves would have preferred in the same context
(MNI 0, 50, 19, t = 4.01, z = 3.34). Accordingly, whenwe searched
for regions that contained a conjunction of voxels responding to
both types of executed, or choice-relevant, value differences
(p < 0.05) we recovered a signal in vmPFC. At the same
threshold, a region within dmPFC contained voxels representing
modeled, or choice-irrelevant, value difference, be it those of the
subject or those of the partner (Figure 3C).
The data presented in Figures 3A and 3B are not multiple
comparison corrected and therefore do not constitute formal
tests. We present these data to illustrate the effects in the indi-
vidual conditions that underlie the formal tests of interaction. In
order to provide a formal test that the regions switched agents
between conditions, we designed a test that selected peaks
exclusively from one choice condition and extracted data from
these peaks in the alternative choice condition. Thus, peaks iso-
lated from self-choice trials were used to assess data in other-
choice trials, and vice versa. This test obviates questions of
multiple comparisons, as peaks are selected from one set of
data and tested in the independent alternative data set. From
within the value-coding region shown in Figure 2A, we selectedNeuthe peaks that correlated maximally with ‘‘self value-difference
relative to other value-difference’’ and with ‘‘other value-differ-
ence relative to self value-difference’’ in each of self-choice
and other-choice conditions. As predicted by the gradient anal-
ysis (Figure 2), this resulted in two peaks at the ventral extreme of
the rmPFC (peak MNI 12, 26, 11, t = 3.57, z = 3.06 for self
choices; peak MNI 3, 17, 8, t = 4.10, z = 3.40 for other
choices) and two peaks at the dorsal extreme (peak MNI 3, 44,
25, t = 4.35, z = 3.55 for self choices; peak MNI 9, 38, 43, t =
5.06, z = 3.94 for other choices) in each condition. We therefore
labeled these peaks vmPFC and dmPFC. We then extracted
data from these peaks in the alternative condition. This allowed
us to test several predictions that the regions switched agents
between conditions, as detailed statistically in Figure 3D. In brief,
vmPFC showed significant effects of self values, but not other
values, during self-choice, and other values, but not self values,
during other-choice. The interaction within vmPFC demon-
strated that vmPFC switched its value coding. dmPFC showed
significant effects of other values, but not self values, during
self choice, and self values, but not other values, during other
choice. Again, the interaction within dmPFC demonstrated a
switched coding pattern. Finally, the formal three-way inter-
action between brain region, value-scheme and choice con-
dition demonstrated that the two regions switched their
coding in opposite fashions, and hence exchanged agents.ron 75, 1114–1121, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1117
B A 
x=2
p<0.01
C 
x=2
p<0.05
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
Self 
Choice:vmPFC 
Other 
Choice:vmPFC 
Self 
Choice:dmPFC 
Other 
Choice:dmPFC 
   
   
Ef
fe
ct
 o
f v
al
ue
  
(c
ho
se
n/
be
st
 - 
un
ch
os
en
/w
or
st
) 
Self Value 
Other Value 
* * * *
t(18)=2.59, p=0.018 t(18)=-1.74, p=0.099 t(18)=-2.35, p=0.030 t(18)=1.95, p=0.067
F(1,18)=9.46, p=0.007 F(1,18)=11.67, p=0.003
F(1,18)=27.08, p<0.0001
Medial Prefrontal Cortex Temporo-parietal cortexD 
-0.6 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
Self Choice:vTP Other 
Choice:vTP 
Self Choice:dTP Other 
Choice:dTP 
t(18)=2.66, p=0.016 t(18)=-3.15, p=0.006 t(18)=-1.64, ns t(18)=1.34, ns
F(1,18)=15.77, p=0.001 F(1,18)=3.795, p=0.062
F(1,18)=29.13, p<0.00005
* * *
Figure 3. Neural Correlates of Value Difference during Delegated Intertemporal Choice
(A) Activity while subjects choose for themselves. Green: Activity associated with subject’s chosen minus unchosen value difference. Yellow: Activity associated
with partner’s preferred minus nonpreferred value difference.
(B) Activity while the subject chooses for their partner. Green: Activity associated with subject’s preferred minus nonpreferred value difference. Yellow: Activity
associated with the partner’s values in the frame of reference of the choices made by the subject on behalf of the partner (chosen value minus unchosen value).
(C) Voxels showing a conjunction of the contrasts shown in green in (A) and yellow in (B) (executed value difference signals) are shown in red. Voxels showing
a conjunction of contrasts shown in yellow in (A) and green in (B) (modeled value difference signals) are shown in blue. Individual maps are thresholded at p < 0.05
before the conjunction analysis.
(D) Formal test that brain regions exchange agents between choice conditions in medial prefrontal and temporoparietal cortices. In each case, data are extracted
from clusters defined by the opposite condition, ensuring no selection bias is present (see text and Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Bars show average
effects of value (chosen/best – unchosen/worst) across subjects. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. All p values are two tailed, and refer to
interaction effects. Significant effects of each bar against 0 (p < 0.05 two tailed) are marked with stars.
See Table S1 and Figure S3.
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Value Computations for Choice and Modeled ChoiceSpecifically, vmPFC always represented the values relevant for
choice, while dmPFC always tracked the values irrelevant for
choice (Figure 3D).
As temporoparietal cortex had exhibited a similar gradient to
rmPFC, we also subjected this region to the test described
above. That is, we tested whether neighboring subregions of
temporoparietal cortex exchanged agents in the different choice
conditions. Again, within a mask defined by the average value
effect over both agents, we applied the same procedure in which
peaks were selected from one choice condition, and data ex-
tracted from the other (Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
This analysis revealed that, as in the medial prefrontal cortex,
dorsal and ventral extremes of temporoparietal cortex ex-
changed agents between conditions. This was true whether1118 Neuron 75, 1114–1121, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Incdata were averaged across hemispheres (Figure 3D) or tested
independently in each hemisphere (Figure S3A).
DISCUSSION
Understanding the values and predicting the actions of other
individuals is important for all social animals. In humans, social
factors impinge on almost every decision that we make. Here,
we show that when we make a value-dependent choice, other
people’s values and preferences are represented in regionally
distinct patterns of neural activity. Notably, the values of other
people were identified with the same computational regressor
(value difference) used to identify personal subjective values
in imaging and single unit physiology studies (Basten et al.,.
Neuron
Value Computations for Choice and Modeled Choice2010; Boorman et al., 2009; Cai et al., 2011; FitzGerald et al.,
2009), suggesting that similarities exist in the neural computa-
tions underlying self and other valuation. However, it was not
the case that value computations for self and other were con-
strained to particular brain regions. Instead, the two representa-
tions swapped locations, both in the prefrontal cortex and in the
temporoparietal cortex, depending on which valuation was rele-
vant to the expression of a current choice.
The two prefrontal brain regions that form the central focus
of our study have been extensively studied in neuroeconomics
and social neuroscience. The vmPFC is a region that lies on
the boundary of the pregenual cingulate cortex (areas 32,25),
the orbitofrontal cortex (area 14) and the medial polar cortex
(medial area 10). It is a region commonly implicated in stimulus
valuation (Hare et al., 2011; Plassmann et al., 2007) and goal-
directed choice (Basten et al., 2010; Hunt et al., 2012; Wunder-
lich et al., 2010, 2012). The rostral dmPFC lies close to the dorsal
boundary of medial area 10, where it meets medial area 9. This
region is not often highlighted in neuroeconomic studies of value
outside the social domain, but is repeatedly activated in tasks
that require subjects to attribute intention to other agents (Beh-
rens et al., 2008, 2009; Frith and Wolpert, 2004; Hampton
et al., 2008; Yoshida et al., 2010). While these activations have
consistently occurred at the same anatomical locations in the
human brain, the precise functional role of the region has been
hard to decipher, partly as it is has not been clear that a homolo-
gous brain region exists in any nonhuman species (although see
Sallet et al., 2011). It is notable that this region is both functionally
and anatomically distinct from a more caudal region in the
dmPFC at the boundary of presupplementary motor area, medial
area 9, and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. This latter region
is commonly implicated in valuation and choice, with opposing
coding to vmPFC (Hare et al., 2011; Kolling et al., 2012; Wunder-
lich et al., 2009). Indeed, when we test the negative (i.e., un-
chosen minus chosen) contrast of executed value difference in
our study, it is precisely this more caudal region that is revealed
(Supplemental Experimental Procedures, Figure S3B).
Our data suggest that the functional organization in medial
prefrontal cortex does not align to the frame of reference of the
individual. Instead activity in vmPFC reflects a choice preference
that is executed and rostral dmPFC a choice preference that is
modeled. Thus, dorsal regions of rostral mPFC contain value
representations in the frame of reference of a modeled (as
opposed to an actuated) preference irrespective of whether
this applies to another’s or to one’s own likely actions and goals.
Likewise, ventral mPFC contains a representation of value in the
frame of reference of an executed choice, even if this executed
choice reflects one’s own or another’s preferences. It is notable
that this is the case despite the fact that partners were explicitly
selected to have opposing preferences (Jenkins et al., 2008).
While other-regarding activity has previously been observed in
the vmPFC (Cooper et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2010), it has often
been assumed that this is because the subject finds altruistic
acts intrinsically rewarding (Fehr and Camerer, 2007). Indeed,
it has been suggested that the valuation system in the vmPFC
represents automated processing of subjective value (Kable
and Glimcher, 2009; Lebreton et al., 2009; Rangel and Hare,
2010). However, this explanation cannot account for the currentNeudata where, during delegated choice, vmPFC reflects the prefer-
ences of the partner, correlating with the difference between the
partner’s chosen and unchosen values, and not with the
subject’s own choice-irrelevant preferences (which are instead
tracked in dmPFC). Hence, in our task vmPFC activity reflects
the selection of executed choices (Boorman et al., 2009; FitzGer-
ald et al., 2009; Noonan et al., 2010), irrespective of whether
these are in line with one’s own valuation.
Previous studies have highlighted mPFC’s role in under-
standing the intentions of other agents, so-called theory of
mind (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006), but attribute this
function exclusively to dmPFC. More recently, computational
accounts have prescribed precise computational functions to
this dmPFC activity during social learning (Behrens et al., 2009;
Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008) . In the current study,
we identify a signal in rostral dmPFC that reflects the values and
preferences of another individual (here temporally discounted at
a rate specific to the individual), even when they are not directly
relevant to the task at hand. Critically, we also show this activity
is not confined to simulating the actions of other individuals.
When subjects are making value-based actions that they would
not normally take (when acting on behalf of another person), their
own values and preferred choices are represented in this same
region of dmPFC. While the simplest interpretation of this effect
is that the region is simulating one’s own, currently irrelevant,
preferences an alternative possibility is that the activity is projec-
ting one’s own values into the mind of the partner, while simu-
lating the partner’s choices. In essence, estimating the extent
to which my own values would influence my partner, if they
were making the choice. This iterated reasoning would be
consistent with previous suggestions that the dmPFC is impli-
cated in such higher order belief inference (Yoshida et al., 2010).
However, while it may seem counterintuitive for neural pro-
cesses to be dedicated to computing values and choices that
do not pertain directly to current goals, such a process is likely
to have importance in many cognitive functions outside social
cognition. For example, optimal decision making may rely on
the ability to model one’s own likely behavior in the context of
future choices that ensue after an immediate action. Our obser-
vation that the exact same computational signals can be
measured for oneself, and for a confederate, in both vmPFC
and dmPFC offers evidence for the idea that self-referential pro-
cessing and mentalising about others share common neural
mechanisms (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Buckner and Carroll,
2007; Mitchell, 2009).EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subject Recruitment and Task Optimization
For a detailed description of the subject screening, and the task optimization,
see the Supplemental Information. In brief, we simulated 10,000 sets of 100
choices between a larger-later and smaller-sooner prizes, and selected the
choice-pair set that led to the most efficient estimate of individual discount
rates. We then screened 87 participants with these choices and selected the
20 subjects with the ten highest and ten lowest discount rates to form our
participant pairs. Last, we simulated a further 10,000 sets of 120 choices for
fMRI scanning that would minimize the correlations between predicted signals
of the two players. We excluded one participant who was unable to replicate
their partner’s choices in the scanner (30% difference between this subject’sron 75, 1114–1121, September 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1119
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Value Computations for Choice and Modeled Choicechoices and their partner’s actual choices by the end of the trial-and-error
learning). This studywas approved by the University College London Research
Ethics Committee.
FMRI
We acquired fMRI data using standard procedures (see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures) designed to minimize susceptibility related artifacts in the
ventral prefrontal cortex. After standard preprocessing (see Supplemental
Information), we analyzed the data using a general linear model with the
following regressors. In each condition (choose for self or other), we included
a regressor defining the main effect of condition, and four parametric regres-
sors reflecting the chosen and unchosen values for each party. For the
currently relevant party, these were sorted according to the choices actually
made. For the currently irrelevant party, they were sorted according to the
choices that would have been made (i.e., the ‘‘chosen value’’ was always
greater than the ‘‘unchosen value’’). We then performed (1 1) contrasts
between each pair of chosen and unchosen values, to give the effects of value
difference.
fMRI Statistics and Thresholding
The data presented in Figure 2 comprise formal statistical tests of execution
versus modeling. In Figures 2A and 2B, clusters are thresholded at t > 3
and cluster corrected for the whole brain at p < 0.01. The tests in Figure 2C
are not performed voxel-by-voxel but rather one for each potential gradient.
A regression is performed in each subject with an indicator of dorsal-ventral
position (1 to 5) as the independent variable, and the relevant BOLD con-
trast at each point as the dependent variable. A random effects t test is then
performed on these gradients across the group. For the difference of gra-
dients test, this is replaced by a paired t test reflecting the difference between
gradients for executed-modeled and gradients for self-other. While these
results would survive Bonferroni correction across several brain regions, we
only in fact performed the spatial gradient analyses on axes within mPFC
and TPC.
The data presented in Figure 3D also present a formal statistical test of
execution versus modeling, in that they test whether the regions switch roles
between conditions. The data shown in Figure 3D show value-related peaks
in vmPFC and dmPFC selected from one choice condition and used to test
the direction of value correlations in the alternative choice condition, therefore
obviating questions of multiple comparisons.
The data presented in Figures 3A and 3B are shown so that the effects that
underlie the statistical tests in the manuscript can be easily understood. They
are figurative and therefore not corrected for multiple comparisons. Neverthe-
less, all shown clusters have peaks at p < 0.002 uncorrected.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes three figures, three tables, and Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.07.023.
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